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Human communication is often thought about in terms of transmitted messages 
in a conventional code like a language. But communication requires a specialized 
interactive intelligence. Senders have to be able to perform recipient design, while 
receivers need to be able to do intention recognition, knowing that recipient design 
has taken place. To study this interactive intelligence in the lab, we developed a 
new task that taps directly into the underlying abilities to communicate in the 
absence of a conventional code. We show that subjects are remarkably successful 
communicators under these conditions, especially when senders get feedback 
from receivers. Signaling is accomplished by the manner in which an instrumental 
action is performed, such that instrumentally dysfunctional components of an 
action are used to convey communicative intentions. The findings have important 
implications for the nature of the human communicative infrastructure, and the 
task opens up a line of experimentation on human communication.
1. Introduction
First principles suggest that there is a hidden infrastructure to the use of language 
and other human conventional communication systems. This infrastructure can 
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bootstrap learners of a language into their first meanings, which gives us the 
means to constantly learn new words, it can help us disambiguate utterances that 
are nearly always multiply ambiguous, and it can help locate a definite message 
in utterances that are vague or general. Grice (1957) in his well-known ‘theory 
of meaning’ suggested that this infrastructure was the essential ability to recog-
nize a signal as being designed to be interpretable – in fact ‘meaning’ in a general 
sense essentially consists of recognizing the signaler’s intentions. Levinson (1995) 
suggested that the ability to engage in this reflexive reasoning about each other’s 
intentions constitutes a very special capacity, an interactional intelligence, which 
is one of the hallmarks of human cognition. This paper is an attempt to explore 
this underlying capacity by isolating it from the superstructure of conventional 
linguistic signs that normally accompanies it (see also Galantucci, 2005; Garrod, 
Fay, Lee, Oberlander, & Macleod, 2007; Healey, Swoboda, Umata, & King, 2007).
It is not always immediately obvious why human communication is such a 
complex enterprise, or why it requires special cognitive abilities. If one were to take 
Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory of communication as a conceptual starting 
point, communication appears – on first glance – to be relatively straightforward. 
In order for a sender to get information across to a receiver, the sender encodes 
information, transmits it to the other side using a physical medium (e.g., sound 
waves through the air), the receiver decodes this information, and communication 
has been achieved. The main challenge to be tackled in the Shannon framework 
is overcoming the problem of signal degradation. Creating redundancy in the sig-
nal makes the communication process less susceptible to the detrimental effects 
of noise. Shannon’s work is relevant for one important aspect of communication, 
namely data transmission. For instance, it has been shown that speech signals con-
tain redundancy, and this redundancy enables listeners to retrieve phonemes from 
a speech stream under suboptimal circumstances like noisy environments (Repp & 
Liberman, 1987).
However, data transmission is not where the real complexity of human-hu-
man interaction resides. What is much less understood is how receivers are able 
to extract the communicative intention that motivated the sender of a signal to 
send it, i.e., the meaning of the transferred information. This problem is gener-
ally referred to as intention recognition (see e.g., Levelt, 1989, p. 59; Wharton, 
2003). Consequently, senders have to produce signals in such a way that the 
receiver has a reasonable chance to do successful intention recognition. This 
counterpart of intention recognition has been called recipient design (Sacks & 
Schegloff, 1979).
The challenge of mapping communicative intentions on to utterances is at 
the core of the field of linguistic pragmatics (Levinson, 1983), and relies heavily 
on the ability to recognize intentions. A compelling example of this is the (often 
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successful) use of highly ambiguous definite references such as “the what do you 
call it” (Enfield, 2003). As Levinson (2006) notes, statistical (e.g., Bayesian) methods 
are not sufficient to provide a general solution to this problem, because there are 
many actions whose interpretation are not in line with statistical associations. 
In ironic utterances, for instance, it is the low probability of the utterance given 
the communicative intention that makes them interpretable at all. Also, Bayesian 
methods rely on previous experience and cannot explain the fast and success-
ful interpretation of signal-to-meaning mappings that a receiver has never 
encountered before.
In order to make it possible for a listener to reconstruct the communicative 
intention from an utterance, a speaker has to ensure that his utterances are con-
structed so that it can be expected that the listener can actually retrieve its original 
communicative intention. This holds not only for linguistic communication, but 
also for non-linguistic communication of any kind. This ability to communicate 
without relying on shared conventions is of fundamental importance. It allows 
human communicators to get across rather elaborate meanings even when the 
communicative circumstances are sub-optimal (e.g., divers under water, people 
in noisy factories) or even when they do not share a common language (the classic 
“tourist asking for directions” scenario). More importantly, this faculty is a crucial 
enabling factor for the creation and use of linguistic symbols (Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). In fact, it seems to provide the essential means for 
learning and developing a conventional communication system – if you can’t grasp 
an intended meaning without knowing the conventional meaning of a signal, there 
would be no way to learn it. Consider the case of ‘home sign’ (Goldin-Meadow, 
Gelman, & Mylander, 2005), where a deaf child of hearing parents invents a sign 
language de novo.
Summarizing, we assume that effective communication involves complex 
computations at both the sender and the receiver’s end. The receiver’s problem is 
one of intention recognition; the sender’s problem is one of recipient design.
. The role of conventions
In many situations the computational complexity of communication can be 
reduced by using previously established conventions (see Lewis, 1968). Instead of 
performing cumbersome computations of the type ‘what would he think I would 
think if he...’ (Clark & Marshall, 1981), human communicators might simply have 
learned over time that ‘can you tell me the time?’ is a not an inquiry into the 
recipient’s abilities, but rather a request to tell the current time, and that it is polite 
to formulate it that way. While it is plausible that most of the time we can rely 
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on communicative conventions, the interactive intelligence needed for recipient 
design is nevertheless essential for successful communication in general. First, in 
order to learn new conventions, we need to be able to recognize the communica-
tive intention of a signal the first time we encounter it, i.e., before a convention 
has been established. Second, we often find ourselves in situations where no com-
municative conventions exist yet, and still are able to get our intentions recog-
nized. To solve this problem, humans need certain heuristics. Following the lucid 
overview in Garrod & Anderson (1987) here, one example of such a heuristic is 
provided by the coordination game investigated by Schelling (1960). Schelling 
proposes that people use salience to achieve coordination, on the grounds that 
what is salient for the communicator is also likely to be salient for their interlocu-
tor. Another heuristic that can be used is precedence (Schiffer, 1972): if a certain 
form-meaning mapping has been used in the past, it can be used again. A key 
study of the development of new communicative (and non-linguistic) conven-
tions is Galantucci (2005) (see also Steels, 2006), in which he required partici-
pants who were playing a computer game to communicate vital information using 
a completely novel (and rather noisy) communicative channel. After a number of 
attempts, subjects were able to develop some kind of conventional signal/mean-
ing mapping and use that convention to their advantage in the game. This study 
is an intriguing demonstration of how humans can develop new semiotic conven-
tions when they need to. However, we want to stress that interactive intelligence 
is not only needed in exceptional situations; work on human dialogue (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 1988) has 
shown that even ordinary, verbal interaction between people who share the same 
language requires interactive intelligence to deal with the pervasive ambiguity of 
communicative signals.
. The present study
As discussed above, there are a priori logical arguments for the view that in order 
to communicate successfully, people need a special kind of communicative intelli-
gence, and there is experimental evidence for the existence of this capacity in human 
communicators (Galantucci, 2005). Here, we want to explore these abilities under 
controlled experimental conditions, using traditional dependent variables such 
as reaction times. For this purpose, we have developed the Tacit Communication 
Game (TCG, see De Ruiter, Noordzij, Newman-Norlund, Hagoort, & Toni, 2007), 
an experimental paradigm for studying human-human communication, while lim-
iting the possibility of using pre-established communicative conventions. The TCG 
 Exploring the cognitive infrastructure of communication 55
is designed to supplement other well-established linguistic communication tasks 
such as the Map Task (Anderson, et al., 1991), or the SLOT paradigm (De Ruiter, 
Rossignol, Vuurpijl, Cunningham, & Levelt, 2003), and it differs from the task used 
by Galantucci (2005) in that it is designed to focus on those cognitive processes in 
individual communicators that are responsible for the development and recogni-
tion of newly created conventions. The TCG also enables the study of the nature of 
those conventions. We use the TCG to address the following questions:
1. How well can senders communicate their intentions to receivers when there 
are insufficient pre-existing communicative conventions?
2. Do reaction times obtained with this task reflect the processing load related to 
interactive processes in the sender?
3. What is the relationship between the processing load of senders and receivers?
4. How do senders use the (very limited) expressive means available to them to 
encode their communicative intentions?
Before reporting on the experiments addressing the above questions, we will first 
outline the essentials of the Tacit Communication Game.
. The Tacit Communication Game
In this game (or task), there are two subjects, who are seated behind separate 
computer screens. These two screens are controlled by one central computer. One 
subject has the role of a sender and the other of a receiver. (For clarity, the male 
pronoun ‘he’ will be used for the sender, while the female pronoun ‘she’ will be used 
for the receiver.) On the computer screens of both the sender and the receiver, a 3 
by 3 grid (the ‘playing board’) is visible. Below the grid, the geometrical shape that 
is under the control of the sender is shown, and above the grid there is a geometri-
cal object that is under the control of the receiver. The three possible objects of 
the sender and receiver are a rectangle, a circle, or a triangle. The participants can 
move their object from one grid position to another, but only along horizontal and 
vertical directions. The objects can also be rotated clockwise or counterclockwise, 
within a given grid position. However, when applied to the circle object, these 
rotations are not visible.
In a typical communicative trial (other experimental conditions are discussed 
below), the sender and only the sender will see a goal configuration, which consist 
of the sender and receiver objects both placed at specific locations in the grid in a 
specific orientation. An example goal configuration can be seen in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. Example goal configuration for TCG
The sender now has to consider and perform two tasks. The first is how to move 
his own object to the location displayed in the goal configuration (i.e., lower right 
corner, see Fig. 1). But at the same time, the sender has to also communicate to the 
receiver where she should place her object (the rectangle), and in which orienta-
tion. The only means the sender has available to transmit this information to the 
receiver is moving around and rotating his own object using a game controller.
The sender is thus required to think of a strategy how to do this. He has unlimited 
time for doing this, and during this planning time the goal configuration is visible 
to him. When the sender has finished planning and presses the start button, the 
goal configuration disappears from the screen, the sender’s object (in this case a 
circle) appears in the center of the grid, and then the sender has five seconds to 
move around and/or rotate his object and achieve his two goals: communicate to 
the receiver where and in which orientation she should put her object, and get his 
own object at the correct location and orientation. After the 5 seconds are over 
and the sender has finished moving his object around (and the moves have been 
observed by the receiver) the receiver’s object is placed in the center of the grid, 
and she can now move her object to the location and orientation that she believes 
is the correct one. A trial is considered to be successful when both sender and 
receiver have put their objects in the location and orientation as specified in the 
goal configuration within the allowed time.
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An important aspect of the TCG is that, as in the experiment by Galantucci 
(2005), it can be assumed that neither the sender nor the receiver have ever been 
in such a communicative situation before, so there are no pre-established commu-




15 pairs of participants (aged 18–26 years; 20 females, 10 males) were recruited to 
participate. They were either offered a standard financial payment (€6 per hour) or 
given credits towards completing a course requirement. Three pairs were excluded 
from analysis based on a misunderstanding of the instruction or the use auditory 
communication, which was not allowed during the game, leaving 12 pairs of sub-
jects. These 12 pairs were randomly assigned to one of two trial orders. Trial order 
was varied for the purpose of counter-balancing for possible order effects.
5.1. Equipment
The game was played on two 19-inch black computer monitors with Logitech 
hand-held controllers (see Fig. 2). The buttons used on the hand-held controller 
were spatially laid out to provide quick and easy learning of spatial movements. 
Players sat at a long table on opposing sides with the computer in between them 
each facing their own computer monitor. Due to the length of the table and the 
position and size of the monitors, the players could not see each other. The game 
was programmed using Presentation version 9.2 and was run on a Windows XP 
personal computer.
Figure 2. The Game Controller with four spatial buttons to move around the board 
(indicated in the front view) and with rotation buttons located on top of the controller 
(left/right, indicated in the top view). There was one start button on top of the controller 
below the right rotation button
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5.1. Procedure
The game board consists of a 3 × 3 grid of grey interlocking tiles presented on a 
black background (see Fig. 3). Game pieces were on the same grey tiles and addi-
tionally had one of three shapes centered on the tile: circle, rectangle, or triangle. 
Shapes were blue, red, or yellow, and had an original starting orientation (horizontal 
rectangle, and point of triangle heading up). Before each trial began and while the 
goal configuration was on the screen, the sender’s shape was located under the game 
board, and the receiver’s shape was located above the game board. When the sender 
pressed his start button, the goal disappeared from the screen leaving the grey game 
board and the sender’s shape in the center box in its “original” orientation. In all 
trials, each player had 5 seconds to move. When the sender’s time was over, the 
receiver’s shape appeared in the center of the game board. The receiver then had 
additional time to interpret what she just saw and plan her movements, and sub-
sequently pushed the start button to begin her movement, beginning the 5 second 
time limit. When the receiver’s time expired both players received feedback regard-
ing their accuracy as a team by a red or green box; incorrect or correct.
For the remainder of this paper, the planning time of the sender is defined as 
the time between the beginning of a trial and the sender pressing the “start” but-
ton, and the planning time of the receiver is defined as the time between the end of 
the last move of the sender and the pressing of the “start button” by the sender.
Receiver






Figure 3. Sequence of events in a TCG trial
1. Players view their shapes (1500 ms)
2. Player(s) see the goal configuration
3. The sender starts his movement sequence by pressing the start button
4. The sender has 5000 ms to move the shape around on the game board
5.  The receiver begins movements from center tile by pressing the start button (the 
sender’s shape remains on screen in position they left it)
6. The receiver has 5000 ms to move her shape around in the game board
7.  Players receive feedback indicating whether they were correct (green box) or incorrect (red 
box) in matching the goal configuration (both the sender and the receiver received this feed-
back, indicating whether they were successful as a team in reproducing the goal configuration)
After being instructed regarding the experimental tasks, participants provided 
their informed consent. Training was conducted to prepare them to play the game 
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together. There were two training sessions before the game began to familiarize the 
participants with the hand-held controller, the order of events in the game, and 
the characteristics of the stimuli. After training, written instructions were then 
provided regarding the game. In all tasks, participants were instructed to perform 
as accurately as possible.
Individual Training. Each participant first trained individually for 40 trials on 
how to use the joystick device to move and rotate their shape on the screen. On 
the game board (3 × 3), they practiced matching goal configurations using a tri-
angle, to maximize the practice of rotating their object (the triangle has the high-
est number of possible orientations). Each trial continued until they matched the 
goal configuration with their shape. When they correctly matched the goal, they 
received a green box indicating they were right. A subsequent trial immediately 
followed. There were no time limits for the initial training.
Joint Training. Once participants felt comfortable with the hand-held control-
ler, they performed a practice session involving 20 trials where both players saw 
the goal configuration and moved to their own location (or did not move because 
the goal position was in the center). The joint training goal configurations utilized 
each of the 9 boxes and each of the 3 shapes (circle, rectangle, or triangle). The goal 
configurations were intermixed with trials where both players either had the same 
shape or different shapes.
5.1. Materials
The game consisted of 120 trials. In the first 20 and thwe last 20 trials of game, all 
players could see the goal configurations and their task was simply to go to their 
own location and match their own orientation. In the middle 80 trials, the receiver 
could not see the goal configuration. Players either had the same shapes or had dif-
ferent shapes. Table 1 shows how the trials were distributed in such a way that the 
same and different shape trials were counterbalanced over the two groups when 
the receiver did not see the goal.
Table 1. Counterbalancing of conditions over the subjects
Trial Order Group A Group B
Trials 1–20 Both players see goal  
Mixed trials
Both players see goal  
Mixed trials
Trials 21–40 The receiver doesn’t see goal: 
Same shapes
The receiver doesn’t see goal: 
Different shapes
Trials 41–80 The receiver doesn’t see goal:  
Different shapes
The receiver doesn’t see goal: 
Same shapes
Trials 81–100 The receiver doesn’t see goal:  
Same shapes
The receiver doesn’t see goal: 
Different shapes
Trials 101–120 Both players see goal;  
Mixed trials
Both players see goal 
Mixed trials
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
5. Results
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether subjects could perform 
the TCG task with reasonable success rates. We therefore analyzed the data from 
trials 21–100, in which the sender saw the goal, but the receiver did not. We 
defined ‘success’ of a trial as the receiver putting her object in the correct location 
and orientation. Overall, 83% of all trials were successful. This is far above chance 
levels: there are nine possible locations and varying numbers of possible orienta-
tions: One for the circle, two for the rectangle, and four for the triangle shape. This 
means that when the receiver shape is a circle, the probability of being correct 
purely by chance is 1/9th, for the rectangle 1/18th, and for the triangle 1/36th. The 
overall success rate of 83% over a total of 960 trials is significantly higher than any 
of these base probabilities (binomial test, p < .001).1
It should be noted here that in piloting Experiment 2 (see below) we noticed 
that one dyad used a clever way to communicate using the clicking noises of the 
game controller for communicative purposes. Although the experimenters did not 
notice such strategies occurring during any of the trials in Experiment 1, it can-
not be completely ruled out that there had been some form of acoustic “leakage” 
that escaped their attention. Since we took measures against any form of acoustic 
leakage in Experiments 2 and 3 by introducing noise resistant headphones and 
ear-plugs, and since the success rates from those experiments were very similar to 
the results in this experiment, we assume that the conclusions from Experiment 1 
are valid, and that the theoretical possibility of undetected acoustic leakage played 
no, or at most only a negligible, role in the reported communicative success rates.
Both receivers and senders were faster (in terms of planning time) and more 
successful with the same-shape trials than with the different-shape trials. A paired 
t-test comparing the averages of the variables planning time of sender, planning time 
of receiver and success within each dyad shows that for planning time of sender, the 
average for same-shape trials was 4148 ms, and for different-shape trials 5245 ms 
(t(11) = 3.015, p < .05). For planning time of receiver the average was 1089 ms for 
same-shape trials, and 1443 ms for different-shape trials (t(11) = 4.077, p < .01). For 
success (as a proportion) the average was .90 in the same-shape condition and .76 
in the different-shape condition (t(11) = 5.797, p > .001).
The underlying cause for this difference between same-shape and different-
shape trials was the difficulty in communicating the orientation of objects, which 
was never a problem when the objects were identical. Some combinations of 
objects, however, lead to difficulties. For instance, indicating a vertical orientation 
using a circle is difficult because circles cannot be oriented vertically. Similarly, 
although a rectangle can be oriented horizontally and vertically, these two ori-
entations cannot be used to indicate, for example, that a triangle (which has four 
possible orientations) is pointing to the right and not to the left. In those trials 
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where the indication of orientation was problematic because the sender’s object 
had fewer possible orientations than the receiver’s object (we will call these trials 
‘hard’ from here on), the success rate was 67%. This is significantly lower than the 
overall success rate (z-test for testing independent proportions, p < .001), but it is 
still far above chance levels (binomial test, n = 240, p < .0001).
The main result from Experiment 1 is that human subjects can successfully 
perform the TCG. In the next experiment, we investigated whether or not feedback 
(in the form of the receiver’s behavior) that senders had access to in experiment 1 
facilitated the communication. We also performed a qualitative analysis to find out 
how the subjects used the limited means provided by the TCG to communicate 
location and orientation to their interlocutor.
. Experiment 2
It is theoretically possible that in our task, a sender develops an encoding strategy 
about the meaning of his moves, and then sticks to it during the experiment, 
hoping that the receiver will, in the end, figure out what the encoding strategy is. 
If this were the case, we would not be studying the combination of recipient design 
and intention recognition, but only whether receivers are able to decipher a cer-
tain encoding strategy that was previously unknown to them. So instead of trying 
different ways to encode information making it easier for receivers to decode it, 
senders would, according to this alternative theory, just use an arbitrary encoding 
strategy and leave it to the receiver to work out what it means.
To rule out the possibility that senders were using this strategy we used a 
design with 40 trials in which senders could see what receivers were doing (and 
hence, how the receivers had interpreted their message) and another 40 trials 
in which they did not get any information about the receiver (i.e., they did not 
see their movements or whether the trial as a whole was correct or incorrect). If 
the senders were systematically applying a fixed encoding strategy, then whether 




16 pairs of participants (aged 18–26; 23 females; 9 males) were recruited to par-
ticipate. They were either offered a standard financial payment (€6 per hour) or 
given credits towards completing a course requirement. Subject pairs were ran-
domly assigned to one of two conditions; starting with feedback or starting without 
feedback (see Table 2 below).
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
.1. Equipment
The same equipment was used as in Experiment 1, only in Experiment 2 we required 
our subjects to wear sound-resistant head sets and ear plugs to minimize the influ-
ence of sounds in the environment and incidental noises produced by the players.2
.1. Procedure
After being instructed regarding the experimental tasks, participants provided 
their informed consent. Training was conducted to prepare them to play the TCG 
together. As in the first experiment, there were two training sessions before the 
game began to familiarize the participants with the hand-held controller, the order 
of events in the game, and the characteristics of the stimuli (see earlier descrip-
tion). Written instructions were then provided regarding the rules of the game. In 
all tasks, participants were instructed to perform as accurately as possible.
.1. Materials
The game consisted of 80 trials and in all trials the receiver could not see the goal 
configuration that the team had to match. Players always had different shapes. 
75% of the trials were ‘hard’ (target object orientation could not be indicated by 
mimicking it with the sender’s shape), 25% were ‘easy’ (it was not necessary to 
indicate target orientation, or target orientation could be indicated by mimicking 
target orientation with the sender’s shape). Table 2 shows how the feedback and 
no-feedback trials were distributed across the two groups.
Table 2. Distribution of conditions over the subjects
Trial Order Group A Group B
Trials 1–20 No feedback Feedback
Trials 21–60 Feedback No feedback
Trials 41–60 Feedback No feedback
Trials 61–80 No feedback Feedback
. Results
First and foremost, we were interested in whether having access to feedback led to 
a higher success rate. Because the effect of feedback might be cumulative, leading 
to an improved success rate over the course of the experiment, a comparison of 
the success rates in the trials with and without feedback was not the appropriate 
analysis. Therefore, we performed a linear regression analysis with the probability 
of success of a certain trial (estimated using the data from all pairs) as dependent 
variable, and two independent variables: first, the order in which the trial occurred 
(Number of trials, with or without feedback), and second, the number of previous 
trials with feedback (Number of feedback-trials). If feedback was effective, the 
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 predictive power of the variable Number-of-feedback-trials should be significantly 
higher than that of Number-of-trials. Using this analysis, we could compare the 
effect of feedback against the baseline of a simple learning effect. It turned out that 
the variable Number-of-trials did not explain a significant proportion of the vari-
ance (t = 1.64, p = .102), whereas Number-of-feedback-trials had a positive beta 
weight (β = 0.135) and explained a significant proportion of the variance (t = 2.33, 
p < .05). These results provide clear evidence that feedback improves the dyad’s 
performance. They also imply that the task at hand is not just a problem solving 
task for the sender or the receiver, but involves at least some elementary form of 
two-way communication between a sender and a receiver.
The second issue that we addressed was that of the processing load in both 
senders and receivers. First, both senders and receivers needed more planning 
time for the ‘hard’ trials than for the ‘easy’ trial. For receivers, this was 2.598 s 
for hard trials vs. 2.031 s for easy ones (t(792) = 3.19, p < .01). For senders the 
differences was 7.68 s. for hard trials, and 5.67 s for the easy ones (t(766) = 6.38, 
p < .0001). However, part of the planning time of senders could well be due to the 
number of moves that they plan to make. Therefore, we performed a regression 
analysis with the planning time of senders as dependent variable, and the number 
of moves they made as well as the nature of the communicative problem (hard vs. 
easy) as predictors. Both factors were predictive, but the factor hard/easy (beta 
weight 1.24, p < .001) much more so than the number of moves (beta weight 0.77, 
p = .007). For receivers, the number of (planned) moves did not explain any vari-
ance in the planning times (beta weight –0.11, p = .7) whereas the factor hard/easy 
did (beta weight 0.08, p = .007) These findings suggest that the planning time of 
both senders and receivers are valid dependent measures that tap into the cognitive 
processes that we wanted to investigate.
But how do the planning times of senders and receivers compare? The mean 
planning time of senders was 7.18 s, while the mean planning time of receivers was 
2.46 s. This difference is significant (paired t-test, t(1359) = 31.76, p < .0001). This 
suggests that in communicative situations without pre-established conventions, the 
main cognitive load is at the sender’s end of things.3 However, this comparison is 
confounded by the fact that receivers can already start processing while the sender 
is still moving his part around the board, in other words, before the clock starts 
ticking for the receiver. Therefore, a better way of investigating the relationship 
between sender and receiver planning time is to compute the (partial) correlation 
between them, correcting for the number of moves made by both senders and 
receivers (which the analaysis above showed to have a positive correlation with 
the planning time). If this correlation were negative, it would suggest a trade-off 
between cognitive effort invested by senders and receivers, in the sense that the 
less work the sender puts in his signal, the more work the receiver has to do, and 
vice versa. The partial correlation between sender and receiver planning times, 
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partialing out the effect of the number of moves was .38 (p < .001),4 which shows 
that a harder problem was more difficult for both senders and receivers. We also 
analysed the correlation between sender and receiver planning times without par-
tialling out the number of moves, which resulted in a correlation of .39 (p <. 001). 
This shows that the highly significant correlation was not dependent on partialling 
out the number of moves. We also checked the correlation between the number 
of moves for senders and receivers, which was also positive (r = .410, p < .001). 
To conclude, we did not find evidence for a trade-off between cognitive effort of 
senders and receivers. The harder a problem is, the more moves and planning time 
we see for both senders and receivers.
To summarize, the results from Experiment 2 revealed that (a) feedback from 
receiver to sender improves the effectiveness of the communication, (b) that both 
senders’ and receivers’ planning times are sensitive to the difficulty of the com-
munication problem, and (c) that there is no trade-off between planning time in 
senders and receivers, indicating that if a communication problem is hard, it is 
harder for both senders and receivers.
. TCG communication strategies
To understand how our participants were able to achieve a relatively high com-
municative success given such limited means to communicate, we performed a 
detailed analysis of the first 20 individual trials for all dyads from Experiment 2 
(cf. Galantucci, 2005).
For the easy trials, one predominantly used strategy was identified:
1. Move object to receiver target location
2. Rotate object to match receiver object orientation
3. Pause (longer than between the previous and following moves).
4. Move object to sender target location.
With this strategy, the overall success rate was 95% for the easy trials. Note that 
the longer pause is essential, as otherwise the receiver does not know which of 
the positions and orientations the sender object has been at is the indicated target 
location. In effect, pausing is used as a “deictic” device here, to first indicate where 
an object needed to go, and rotating (or other strategies outlined below) to indi-
cate what had to be done with the object. More interesting were the strategies used 
for the hard trials. One of the reasons the hard trials presented our participants 
with a challenge was what we call the orientation problem: As has been already 
mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 1, it was not possible to mimic the 
orientation of a rectangle with a circle, or the orientation of a triangle with either a 
circle or a rectangle. This is a simple consequence of the fact that circles have only 
one, rectangles have two, and triangles have four possible orientations.
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To study the strategies that were used to solve the orientation problem, we 
inspe-cted the first 20 trials of every dyad in the experiment. During these trials, 
senders either had feedback all the time, or did not have feedback for any of the 
trials. This enabled a comparison between strategy use with and without (persis-
tent) feedback.
In the first 20 trials, there were 13 trials in which the orientation problem 
occurred, leading to a total of 208 data points. The strategies that were used to solve 
this problem were the following, ordered by frequency of use from high to low:
A. Go to receiver target position, pause, then move the object one square in the 
direction that the triangle is “pointing to”, or in case of the rectangle, along 
the axis that the rectangle is oriented along (horizontal of vertical), then move 
back to the receiver target position, pause, and then move to the sender target 
position (used 80 times, successful 60 times, 75% success rate). Strategy A is 
illustrated in Fig. 6 below.
B. The same strategy as described as successful for the easy trials. This strategy 
was used in 56 cases. This strategy obviously fails to communicate the receiv-
er’s object’s orientation. Because in the hard trials the goal orientation of the 
receiver’s object was always different from its initial orientation, it always had 
to be rotated. Since the target orientation was not signalled at all in this strat-
egy, receivers did not know that their object had to be rotated, and therefore it 
is not surprising that the success rate of this strategy was 0%.
C. Similar to B, but trying to match the orientation of the triangle using a rect-
angle, used 20 times. As the triangle has four possible orientations, and the 
rectangle only two, this strategy maximally transmits only half the amount of 
information needed to identify the correct orientation of the triangle. Theo-
retically, this would predict maximally 50% chance of success, but in fact the 
strategy was only successful in 5 cases, which is 25%.
D. Similar to B, but now trying to indicate orientation by selecting the path 
from receiver position to sender position that matches the orientation of the 
receiver object. This strategy is illustrated in more detail below. The strategy 
was used 7 times and was never successful.
E. Indicating that the triangle was “upside down” relative to its initial position 
by rotating the rectangle twice. This signals to the receiver that (s)he has to 
perform two rotation actions, which would in the case of the triangle result in 
it being rotated 180% degrees relative to its original orientation. This strategy 
was used 6 times and was successful 4 times (67%).
F. Same as E, but now rotating the rectangle only once. This strategy was used 5 
times. Although it appears to be dysfunctional, it was successful once (20%).
G. Same as E, but now rotating the rectangle three times. This strategy was used 
once, and was not successful.
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
F. Using a very elaborate (longer than necessary) path from starting position to 
receiver position to indicate the orientation vector of the receiver object. This 
strategy was only used once, and it was successful.
I. Finally, for 32 trials the strategy could not be identified. Of these cases, only 
one trial was successful (3%).
In Table 3 below, the strategies and their frequencies are summarized.
Table 3. Used strategies and their frequencies and success rates for the orientation problem
Strategy Number of times used Number of times successful Success percentage
A 80 60 75
B 56 0 0
C 20 5 25
D 7 0 0
E 6 4 67
F 5 1 0
G 1 0 0
H 1 0 0
I 32 1 3
The most frequently used (and most successful, if we do not count strategy 
H which was only used once) strategy A is illustrated in Fig. 4 below. This is an 
example of strategy A in the case of the hardest of the orientation problems, which 
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is indicating the target position and orientation of a triangle using a circle. The dotted 
triangle indicates the target position for the receiver object (a triangle), while the 
dotted circle indicates the target position for the sender object (a circle). Moves 3 
and 4 are performed in order to transmit the desired orientation of the triangle. 
After move 2 there is a noticeable pause to indicate that the reached position is the 
target position.
To explain strategy D in more detail, we refer to Fig. 5 below. The dotted trian-
gle indicates the receiver target position and orientation of the triangle. The dotted 
circle is the sender target position of the circle. The sender has moved his object 
to the receiver target location, as in the first part of strategy I. Now to move to the 
sender target position, the sender has two possible first moves. He can either go 
down or to the right. By choosing the path that starts going to the right, indicated 
by the solid arrows, he may be signaling to the receiver that the triangle is oriented 
with its point to the right. Note that this strategy only has a chance of succeeding 
because there is another path available as well. We show this (possible) strategy in 
more detail because it illustrates the problem that the receiver is faced with. She 
has to figure out (a) what are the choices that the sender has, (b) whether choosing 
a certain path is meaningful, and (c) if so, what does it mean?
Figure 5. Example move sequence for strategy D
Strategy A, both the most used and the most successful one, reveals interesting 
similarities with the strategy that was predominantly and successfully used in the 
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
easy trials. The strategy is essentially the same, only an extra movement sequence 
is inserted (bracketed by pauses) to indicate the orientation of the triangle.
To summarize, we found that the successful and most frequently used signal-
ing strategies used by senders have the following properties:
a. If there are no orientation or center problems, the sender uses his own object 
to signal the target location of the receiver object by moving to that location, 
and indicate the location by pausing at that location.
b. For the hard problems, senders re-use the strategy for the easy trials, extend-
ing the convention by inserting extra sequences to communicate the target 
orientation in non-conventional ways.
c. Senders separate the signaling of orientation and location by using separate 
motion sequences. They separate the different component messages from each 
other by pausing longer than between other moves (see Experiment 3 below 
for a statistical analysis of pause durations).
These findings shed some light on the general principles used in communication. 
Conventions are used whenever possible, and can be established relatively quickly. 
This phenomenon has also been documented in dialogue (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Carroll, 1980; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Galantucci, 
2005; Schober & Brennan, 2003). If existing conventions are not sufficient, new 
ones can develop, and they are likely to be built on top of the existing ones. Finally, 
communicators are remarkably flexible in using even highly limited channels by 
exploiting the degrees of freedom they have in their formulations, provided that 
they know that the receiver of a signal is aware of the limitations and degrees of 
freedom that the sender has.
The final analysis presented in this section concerns the presence of feedback 
or not. For half of the dyads, the first 20 trials were all with feedback, while for the 
other half the first 20 trials were all without feedback. If senders would indeed be 
helped by feedback, this would predict that senders that receive feedback would 
find the best solution for the orientation problem, strategy A, sooner than those 
without feedback. This turned out to be the case. For the dyads without feedback, 
the average number of previously presented trials that contained the orientation 
problem before the dyad started using strategy A was 10.5, while for the dyads with 
feedback this was 3.75 (t(14) = 2.415, p < .05, two-tailed). This result is consistent 
with the results of the regression analysis presented above. Another interesting 
variable is the average number of different strategies that senders used for the 
orientation problem. This number was not significantly different for both the feed-
back and no-feedback groups (no-feedback: 4.9, feedback: 4.0, t(14) = 1.59, p = .13, 
two-tailed). In fact, the number of used strategies is higher for the non-feedback 
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group. This indicated that even without feedback, senders do not rely on picking 
one strategy that they think makes sense, and then let the receiver work out what it 
means. Instead, even when they do not get feedback either about the success of the 
communication, or the interpretation by the sender (as seen in the feedback con-
dition by the moves he makes), they try out different encoding strategies. Finally, 
it is important to note that the receivers in the feedback condition did not try to use 
extra moves to signal their level of understanding back to the receiver. The only 
thing they revealed to the sender was their “understanding” of the communicative 
intention of the sender, by making the moves that they thought were required of 
them. This information was sufficient for the senders to improve the effectiveness 
of their communicative efforts.5
. Experiment 3
In a third experiment we varied the function of the behavior of the senders. Exper-
iment 3 was aimed at studying the same behavior in either communicative or non-
communicative contexts. In one part of the experiment we asked them to move 
their object to the recipient’s location and match the orientation of the recipient’s 
object as well as possible, and then move to their own target location. Crucially, 
the recipients themselves knew the target location and orientation of their object. 
These are the non-communicative trials. In another part, we asked senders to sig-
nal the receiver’s target location to the receiver, who, as in Experiment 1 and 2, 




16 pairs of participants (aged 18–26 years; 16 right-handed Dutch males; 16 
right-handed female partners) were recruited to participate. They were either offered 
a standard financial payment (€6 per hour) or given credits towards completing a 
course requirement.
.1. Equipment
The same equipment was used as in Experiment 1 and 2. However, in this experi-
ment the sender was in a different room than the receiver, who played the game 
from another room6 while wearing noise-resistant head phones to minimize 
acoustic distractions.
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
.1. Procedure
After being instructed regarding the experimental tasks, participants provided 
their informed consent. Training was conducted to prepare them to play the TCG 
together. There were three training sessions before the first part of the game to 
familiarize the participants with the hand-held controller, the order of events in the 
game, and the characteristics of the stimuli. A fourth training was performed after 
the first session to learn the new “version” of the game. In all tasks, participants 
were instructed to perform as accurately as possible.
.1. Training
Individual Training. See Experiment 1 and 2.
Joint Training 1. See Experiment 1 and 2. For this experiment participants 
received only 10 Joint Training trials (all Baseline trials), because an additional 
joint training (Joint Training 2a) was added.
Joint Training 2a. In this training of 20 trials the receiver did not see the target 
configuration in 75% of the practice trials (Communication trials). The sender was 
instructed that with his shape he could try to instruct his partner on where to place 
the shape and which orientation it needed to be in. The other 25% of the trials 
were Baseline trials, in which both players could see the goal configurations and 
their task was to simply go to their own location and match their own orientation. 
Because the Communication and Baseline trials were intermixed in this training, 
and during the actual experiment, the transparency of the color of the shape of the 
receiver indicated the type of trial to participants. For Baseline trials the color of 
the shape of the receiver was solid red. For Communication trials the color was 
transparent red. This difference in transparency was highly salient and very clear 
to participants.
Joint Training 2b. In this training of 20 trials both players always saw the goal 
configuration, but the sender was instructed on 75 % of the trials (No-Communi-
cation trials) to first move his shape to the position of the shape of the receiver and 
match the rotation of the shape of the receiver as well as possible. The other 25% of 
the trials were Baseline trials (the same as for Joint Training 2a). For Baseline trials 
the color of the shape of the receiver was solid red. For No-Communication trials the 
color was transparent red.
.1.5 Materials
The game consisted of two sessions of 80 trials; 40 baseline trials and 40 trials that 
were either no-communication or communication trials. In both the communica-
tive and the non-communicative conditions, some trials (10 in total per session) were 
‘hard’ (see above at the discussion of Experiment 1 for a definition). The 16 pairs were 
assigned to one of two trial orders: Communication-No_Communication (eight 
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pairs) or No_Communication-Communication (eight pairs) to counter-balance 
for order effects.
. Results
The main purpose of Experiment 3 was to compare the same behavior occurring 
in either a communicative or a non-communicative context. If the planning time 
of senders only reflects problems they have at expressing orientation (regard-
less of what the aim of this expression is) then these planning times should be 
the same for communicative and non-communicative trials. In contrast, if the 
planning time of the senders also incorporate processing load for interactive 
processes (i.e., recipient design), then the processing load should be higher for 
communicative than non-communicative trials. Furthermore, given the highly 
limited expressive means available to the subjects, an important question is how 
senders use these highly limited means to inform the receiver of the intended 
target position and orientation.
The planning time of the sender was longer for communicative trials (Mean: 
3945 ms.) than non-communicative trials (Mean: 2705 ms.), t(15) = 3.6, p = .003. 
This difference shows that there is an additional processing load for senders in com-
municative than non-communicative trials, which we would explain as reflecting 
additional interactive processes related to recipient design.
After an extensive qualitative inspection of the motion sequences that senders 
used in the TCG (see previous section), it appeared that senders first moved their 
object to the receiver’s location to indicate the goal position, using timing to indicate 
which of the many positions that the sender’s object had reached was the actual 
receiver’s position. It appeared that when the sender’s object was on the (receiver’s) 
target position, it was held still a little longer than when it was on other posi-
tions. To test whether this is a statistically reliable effect, we compared how long 
the sender’s object held still on the intended receiver’s position (if the sender did 
move at all to that position), and how long the sender held still on all other posi-
tions. We excluded the first and the last position of movement sequences from this 
analysis, as they are contaminated by the fact that they mark the beginning and 
end of the entire trial. If senders use timing (i.e., longer pausing) to indicate that 
a certain position is the goal position, there should be (a) longer holding times at 
receiver’s goal locations than at other locations, and (b) this effect should be larger 
for communicative trials than for non-communicative trials. The results of this 
analysis (see Fig. 6) are clear. First, senders hold their object for a longer duration 
in target positions than in non-target positions (F(1,20) = 83.4, p < .001), and 
second, this effect is much larger for the communicative condition: the interaction 
for pause times between the factors communicativeness (yes vs. no) and position 
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
(target vs. non-target) is significant (F(1,20) = 19.3, p < .001). Note that target 
positions are often points where the direction of the motion sequence is reversed, 
which explains why target positions have longer average pause times in the non-


























Figure 6. Mean pause times in senders’ moves
. Summary and conclusions
Communication is more than just data transmission from senders to receivers, 
and some theoreticians (e.g., Levinson, 1995, 2006) have claimed that humans 
have a specialized kind of cognitive processing to deal with the complexities 
of intention recognition and recipient design. We set out to directly explore 
these cognitive processes in the laboratory, in isolation from the conventional 
linguistic system that usually accompanies it. We found that most subjects were 
able to communicate successfully without any pre-established conventions 
(cf. Galantucci, 2005), and that the effectiveness of the communication increases 
when senders have access to feedback from the receiver, showing that the task is 
truly interactional. We believe that these findings provide some support for the 
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notion of a specialized communicative intelligence, for the following reasons. First, 
the problem that the participants were facing is not a classical “puzzle” with a specific 
sought-after “solution”. Rather, the task put the participants in a communicative 
context and required of them to produce communicative behavior, not solve a 
cognitive conundrum. Second, Experiment 3 shows that an essential component of 
the resulting communicative behavior was to introduce differences in inter-move 
timing in the order of a few hundred milliseconds, which is a level of precision 
in the timing of behavior that is normally outside of conscious control. However, 
there is an alternative explanation for our findings, namely that our participants 
were not using specialized communicative skills, but rather were invoking general 
cognitive (problem solving) capacities to perform so well on our task. We concede 
that this alternative explanation cannot be ruled out by our findings. That would 
ideally require experimenting with individuals with high problem solving skills 
on the one hand, and limited communicative skills on the other. Perhaps further 
experiments with participants with high-functioning autism-spectrum disorders 
(e.g., Asperger syndrome) could resolve this issue. If individuals from such popu-
lations would show an ability to solve complex cognitive problems of a similar 
cognitive complexity, but not the TCG, this would provide conclusive support for 
the existance of specialized communicative processing.
The task appears to be a valid tool for estimating the cognitive load associated 
with recipient design in senders and intention recognition in receivers simulta-
neously. The strongest evidence for the validity of our task is that the harder the 
communicative problem is, the more planning time is needed by both the sender 
and the receiver. This extra planning time was mainly caused by the nature of 
the communicative problem, and much less by the number of moves that were 
performed per trial.
This task allows us to explore the “interactional intelligence” which is typical 
for human communication in a context which strips away the complex conven-
tions that are normally erected on that foundation, and which thus obscure it. The 
task, or variants thereof, could be used to address a host of scientific questions 
beyond the ones addressed in this study. It could be used to assess the underlying 
communicative capabilities in a variety of genetic and neurological disorders (e.g., 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, Williams syndrome, Down’s syndrome, aphasia etc.) 
independent of the varying linguistic competence of the investigated subjects. The 
task might also be adapted to investigate the communicative capabilities in other 
social vertebrates, which lack an arbitrary conventional sign system, and to explore 
the development of interactive capabilities in human infancy. Furthermore, the 
task could also be used to measure other dependent variables such as neurophysi-
ological signals and eye-tracking data, and thus promises to open up the nature of 
human interactive intelligence to many different kinds of experimental probe.
 J.P. de Ruiter, et al.
It is important to stress that although the task used in our experiment differs 
from everyday communication (in which conventions are abundant), the cognitive 
process that we try to focus on in our experiments is fundamental for ‘ordinary’ com-
munication. Even well articulated linguistic utterances are pervasively ambiguous, 
as illustrated by the infamous and frequently used definite reference (e.g., “when is 
the meeting?”). Only the combination of recipient design in senders and intention 
recognition in receivers enables communicators to be effective.
Finally, we found that people are remarkably effective in using whatever 
limited means of communication they have. While moving around their object 
on the grid, senders in our study systematically used manner (which, in the 
context of the task we used, was expressed by timing) as a nonverbal diacritic 
to indicate a certain position, thereby also assisting receivers in parsing the 
sequence of behavioral events into meaningful sub-units. As slowing down at 
certain positions is not instrumental for the functional goal of the sender (i.e., 
moving an object to a location), receivers can infer that the slowing down per-
forms a communicative function. In this case, the inferred function is a deictic 
one: it singles out a certain position from other possible positions. This type of 
inference is similar to the finding by Gergely, Bekkering & Király (2002) that 
children who observe an adult switching on a light with their head will only 
imitate the use of the head if the hands of the adult were unrestrained. When 
the use of the head in that situation is not functionally motivated (or ‘rational’, 
see Gergely & Csibra, 2003), it is interpreted as providing information in the 
sense of Bateson’s (1972) famous definition: “information is a difference that 
makes a difference” (p. 453).
The insight that cooperative interaction is subject to this kind of means-
ends reasoning, so that deviations from the functionally optimal strategy carry 
communicative load, forms the central idea in Grice’s (1975) other important 
theory, concerning the maxims of cooperative interaction. Thus, the use of non-
functional behavior for communicative purposes is also very common in linguis-
tic communication. For example, in referring to third persons, providing more 
information than is strictly necessary for resolving the reference communicates 
additional information to the listener. If someone refers to a colleague as “Profes-
sor William F. Smith”, where a simple “Bill” would have sufficed, the apparent 
redundancy in the reference signals the presence of additional communicative 
intentions (see Enfield & Stivers (2007) for examples from different languages, 
and Levinson (2000) for the general principle involved). The finding that this same 
principle is used in both tacit nonverbal communication and verbal interaction 
using all the rich resources of linguistic conventions provides additional evi-
dence for the existence of a specialized cognitive infrastructure that is dedicated 
to communication.
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Notes
1. Interestingly, of all the trials that were the first to occur in the experimental sequence, 42% 
was successful, which is still above chance.
. We first ran two subject pairs that were subsequently excluded from the experiment: one 
pair because of their extremely poor performance which turned out to be due to a misun-
derstanding of the instruction, and another pair was excluded because they used auditory 
means of communication: they were “rotating” the circle, which had no visual effect but 
communicated by transmitting multiple clicking sounds. These problems were addressed 
by (a) creating a clearer instruction and (b) requiring the participants to wear ear-plugs and 
closed noise-resistant headphones to prevent any form of auditory communication.
. Separate analysis for successful and non-successful trials resulted in the same pattern of 
results for both groups.
. When we analyzed successful and non-successful trials separately, we found the same 
pattern of results for both groups of trials.
5. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out to us the interesting possi-
bility of receivers using their moves to send “meta-information” back to the senders.
. The reason for moving one of the participants to another room was that we wanted to 
extend the paradigm such that we could put one of the participants in an MR scanner.
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